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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Johnstown Corporation ("Johnstown") and Stardyne, Inc. 
("Stardyne") have petitioned for review of an order of the 
National Labor Relations Board ("the Board"), holding that they 
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations 
Act ("the Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (5), and the Board has 
cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order.  The Board's order 
was predicated on the conclusion that Johnstown and Stardyne were 
"alter egos."  In reaching this conclusion, the Board did not 
disturb a finding by the administrative law judge ("ALJ") that 
Stardyne was not created to evade Johnstown's responsibilities 
under the Act.  In addition, the Board found it unnecessary to 
decide whether Johnstown and Stardyne constituted a "single 
employer." 
 In their petition for review, Johnstown and Stardyne 
contend, first, that the Board's conclusion that they are alter 
egos is inconsistent with the ALJ's undisturbed finding that 
 
 
Stardyne was not created for the purpose of evading Johnstown's 
obligations under the Act.  We disagree with this argument.  
Johnstown and Stardyne next argue that the Board's holding on the 
alter ego question is not supported by substantial evidence.  
Again, we disagree.  Finally, Johnstown and Stardyne contend that 
the Board's alter ego holding is inconsistent with Board 
precedent to the effect that the alter ego doctrine is a "subset" 
of the single employer doctrine.  We find this argument 
meritorious.  We therefore grant the petition for review in part, 
and we deny the Board's cross-petition for enforcement in part.  
We remand to the Board for clarification of its precedents 




 In 1988, Johnstown, a manufacturer of steel products,   
established an innovative laser welding operation at its main 
facility in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.  Scientists affiliated with 
Pennsylvania State University headed the project, and Johnstown 
also assigned ten of its production and maintenance employees to 
work on the laser operation.  These employees were members of a 
bargaining unit represented by the United Steelworkers of America 
(the "union"), and they continued to be covered by Johnstown's 
collective bargaining agreement with the union when they were 
transferred to the laser operation. 
 By 1989, the laser operation was experiencing significant 
financial problems.  Although Johnstown believed that the 
 
 
operation could become profitable, the company was not prepared 
to spend any more money on it.  Moreover, the scientists who were 
working on the project were demanding a share of the operation.  
In order to address these problems, Johnstown decided to sell the 
laser operation for approximately $2,550,000 to Stardyne, a newly 
created corporation that was jointly owned by Johnstown and 
officers of the new company.1  To finance the purchase, Stardyne 
borrowed three million dollars.  After the arrangements for the 
spin-off had been made, management representatives met with the 
Johnstown production and maintenance employees who were 
interested in continuing to work on the laser operation.  All but 
one of these employees accepted a job with Stardyne, but under 
terms different from those contained in Johnstown's collective 
bargaining agreement. 
 After learning that management had negotiated directly with 
and hired production and maintenance employees from Johnstown, 
the union wrote a letter to Stardyne requesting that Stardyne 
recognize the union as the collective bargaining representative 
for these employees.  Stardyne, however, refused this request, 
and the union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board.  
In response to these charges, the General Counsel filed a 
complaint alleging that Johnstown and Stardyne were a "single 
employer" and/or "alter egos," or at a minimum, that Stardyne was 
                     
1.  Shares of Stardyne were distributed at this time as follows:  
40% to Johnstown; 20% to Jack Sheehan (Chairman of the Board and 
majority stockholder in Johnstown); 20% to Ed Sheehan (Jack 




a "successor" to Johnstown.  The complaint charged that Johnstown 
and Stardyne had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (5), by bargaining individually with 
employees represented by the union, by imposing new working 
conditions on these employees, and by repudiating its collective 
bargaining agreement with the union. 
 After notice and a hearing, an ALJ held that Johnstown and 
Stardyne were guilty of the unfair labor practices charged in the 
complaint.  The ALJ turned first to the question whether 
Johnstown and Stardyne constituted a single employer or alter 
egos.  When two entities are found to be a single employer, one 
entity's collective bargaining agreement covers the other entity 
as well, provided that the two entities' employees constitute a 
single appropriate bargaining unit.  See South Prairie Constr. 
Co. v. Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 425 
U.S. 800, 805 (1976).  However, if two entities are found to be 
alter egos, a collective bargaining agreement covering one entity 
is automatically deemed to cover the other.  Howard Johnson Co. 
v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant 
Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974); NLRB v. Omnitest 
Inspection Services, Inc., 937 F.2d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 The ALJ listed the determinative criteria for a single 
employer finding as "interrelations of operations, common 
management, centralized control of labor relations and common 
ownership."  313 N.L.R.B. 170, 178 (1993).  The ALJ found that 
there was common ownership but no interrelation of operations, 
and he found that the evidence was unclear regarding the 
 
 
participation of Johnstown's management in day-to-day operations 
and labor relations decisionmaking at Stardyne.  Id. at 180.  On 
balance, the ALJ refused to hold that Johnstown and Stardyne were 
a single employer.   
 By contrast, the ALJ found that Johnstown and Stardyne were 
alter egos.  The ALJ observed that "[t]he Board's criteria for 
finding that two entities are alter egos are somewhat broader 
than its standards for finding a single employe relationship."  
Id.  In addition to the factors considered in deciding whether 
two entities constitute a single employer, the ALJ noted, other 
relevant factors in making an alter ego determination include 
"substantially identical business purposes, operations, 
equipment, customers and supervision."  Id.  "A further 
consideration," the ALJ noted, "is whether the new company was 
created `to evade responsibilities under the Act.'"   Id. 
(quoting Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1301 (1982)).  In 
this case, the ALJ found that Johnstown and Stardyne had 
substantially identical ownership, business purposes, operations, 
equipment, customers, supervision, and employees.  Id.   The ALJ 
refused to find that Stardyne was created to evade Johnstown's 
obligations under the Act,2 but the ALJ nevertheless concluded, 
                     
2.  The ALJ stated: 
 
 When Stardyne went into operation at the end of that 
year, twelve of [Johnstown's] 390 employes were 
employed by Stardyne.  It seems illogical to me that 
Johnstown would have staged such an elaborate charade, 
involving the borrowing of $3,000,000; considerable 
investment in time and money by the Ed Sheehans, 
father and son, who became officers in Stardyne and by 
Jack Sheehan, who became a director; what must have 
 
 
based on the totality of the factors, that Johnstown and Stardyne 
were alter egos.  Id. at 181.  Relying on these same factors, the 
ALJ also concluded that Stardyne was Johnstown's successor and 
was therefore obligated to recognize and bargain with the union 
that represented Johnstown's employees.3  Id. 
 Turning to the substance of the charges in the complaint, 
the ALJ held that the two companies had violated Section 8(a)(1) 
and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (5), when 
management representatives bypassed the union, dealt directly 
with the Johnstown employees assigned to the laser project, and 
induced them to enter into separate employment agreements.  The 
ALJ further held that the companies had violated Section 8(a)(1) 
and (5) by unilaterally altering these employees' working 
conditions.   The ALJ therefore recommended that the companies be 
ordered to recognize and bargain with the union, to abide by the 
(..continued) 
been substantial sums of money paid to accountants, 
bankers and lawyers to set up the new corporation, 
arrange for loans and bank accounts, incorporate 
Stardyne and draft numerous documents such as 
agreements of purchase and sale, and, complex long-
term lease, where in the end, the object was to carve 
out a unit of twelve or so people from the bargaining 
unit.  Whatever long-term goals Johnstown may have 
envisioned for Stardyne, or may have now, it does not 
seem to me to have been a businesslike decision to 
incur all of these expenses for such a meager result. 
 
313 N.L.R.B. at 180-81. 
3.  A successor, although not bound by its predecessor's 
collective bargaining agreement, is required to recognize and 
bargain with the union that represented its predecessor's 
employees.  NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs. Inc., 406 U.S. 
272, 281 (1972); Systems Management Inc. v. NLRB, 901 F.2d 297, 
301 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and to reimburse 
any employees who had been injured as a result of any failure to 
abide by this agreement. Id. at 183. 
 Both Johnstown and Stardyne filed exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision with the Board, but the Board adopted the ALJ's 
recommended order.  The Board concluded that it was unnecessary 
to review the ALJ's determination that Johnstown and Stardyne 
were a single employer, because the ALJ was correct in finding 
that "Stardyne is a successor to Johnstown [] as well as an alter 
ego."  Id. at 171.  The Board so held even though it agreed with 
the ALJ that "there [was] not sufficient evidence to establish 
that Stardyne was created so that Johnstown could `evade 
responsibilities under the Act.'"  Id. (citation omitted).  
 Johnstown and Stardyne independently petitioned this court 
for review, and the Board filed a cross-application for 
enforcement of its order.  In their petitions for review, the 
companies each argue that they cannot be alter egos as a matter 
of law because the Board expressly found that Stardyne was not 
created to evade responsibilities under the National Labor 
Relations Act.  They also argue that the Board's finding that 
they were alter egos is not supported by substantial evidence.  
Last, Johnstown and Stardyne argue that under established Board 
precedent, the ALJ's undisturbed finding that they were not a 
single employer precluded a finding that they were alter egos.  





 II.  
 A.  Application of the National Labor Relations Act to 
cases involving a reorganization of an employer has proven to be 
vexing.  In order to deal with such cases, the Board developed 
its alter ego doctrine, which was first recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 
(1942).    
 In Southport, after the Board had issued a remedial order 
against a company, the company was dissolved and reorganized, and 
the Board then sought enforcement against the new corporation.  
The new shareholders sought dismissal of the order because the 
predecessor company had been dissolved, but the Supreme Court 
rejected their claims, noting that "[w]hether there was a bona 
fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership--which would 
terminate the duty of reinstatement created by the Board's order-
-or merely a disguised continuance of the old employer . . . is a 
question of fact to be resolved by the Board . . . ."  Id.  As 
the Court later explained in Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 259 n.5: 
 [Alter ego] cases involve a mere technical change in 
the structure or identity of the employing entity, 
frequently to avoid the effect of the labor laws, 
without any substantial change in its ownership or 
management.  In these circumstances the courts have 
had little difficulty holding that the successor is in 
reality the same employer and is subject to all the 
legal and contractual obligations of its predecessor.   
 Following Southport and Howard Johnson, the Board, in 
Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976), enunciated 
seven objective factors that it has consistently applied in 
evaluating whether two companies are alter egos.  These factors 
 
 
are whether "the two enterprises have `substantially identical' 
management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, 
and supervision, as well as ownership."  Id.  The Board does not 
require the presence of each factor to conclude that alter ego 
status should be applied.  See, e.g., Fugazy Continental Corp., 
265 N.L.R.B. at 1301-02.   
 B.  A major issue in this case is whether the Board, when 
it seeks to apply the alter ego doctrine, must find that the 
change in ownership was motivated by an intent to avoid  
obligations under the National Labor Relations Act.  This issue 
has yielded no consensus among the courts of appeals that have 
considered it.4  The Board, however, does not require a finding 
                     
4.  Generally, the circuits have taken three different 
approaches.  See generally Gary MacDonald, Labor Law's Alter Ego 
Doctrine:  The Role of Employer Motive in Corporate 
Transformations, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1024, 1039-52 (1988) (surveying 
the positions taken by the courts of appeals).  Both the First 
Circuit and Eighth Circuits have held that illicit intent is the 
critical inquiry in an alter ego determination.  Penntech Papers, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
892 (1983); Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 
1305, 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 1088 (1984).  The 
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia 
Circuits have held that intent is not essential to the imposition 
of alter ego liability but is a factor that the Board may take 
into consideration.  Goodman Piping Prods. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 
11 (2d Cir. 1984); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-
Farnsworth, Inc. 690 F.2d 489, 508 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 932 (1983); NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 
576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Bell Co., 561 F.2d 1264, 1268 
n.4 (7th Cir. 1977); Tanaka Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029, 
1033 (9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 636 F.2d 266, 270 
(10th Cir. 1980); Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 
1416, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Finally, the Fourth Circuit has 
adopted a "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard that focuses 
on "whether the transfer resulted in an expected or reasonably 
foreseeable benefit to the old employer related to the 
elimination of its labor obligations."  Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 
1014, 1019-20 (4th Cir. 1983).  
 
 
of "intent to evade responsibilities under the Act," but treats 
such intent as an additional factor to be considered (in addition 
to the Crawford Doors factors) when determining alter ego status.  
See, e.g., Hiysota Fuel Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 763, 763 n.2 (1986);  
Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. at 1301; Advanced 
Electric, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1001, 1002 (1984).   
 In deciding whether the Board's position should be 
sustained, we apply the standards set out by the Supreme Court in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984).  See ABF Freight Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 114 
S. Ct. 835, 839 (1994); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 
847-48(1992); Resorts Int'l Hotel Casino v. NLRB, 996 F.2d 1553, 
1555 (3d Cir. 1993).  We first ask "whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue."  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
842.  "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter."  Id.  If it is not, we may not "simply impose [our] own 
construction on the statute."  Id.  "Rather, if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
(..continued) 
 
    The commentators who have discussed this issue are also 
divided.  Compare Frederick Slicker, A Reconsideration of the 
Doctrine of Employer Successorship--A Step Toward a Rational 
Approach, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 1051, 1064 (1973) (arguing for an 
intent based standard); Comment, Bargaining Obligations After 
Corporate Transformations, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 624, 638 (1979) 
(same) with Stephen Befort, Labor Law and the Double Breasted 
Employer:  A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego 
Doctrines and a Proposed Reformulation, 67 Wisc. L. Rev. 67, 101 
(1987) (arguing against requiring intent); Gary MacDonald, Labor 
Law's Alter Ego Doctrine:  The Role of Employer Motive in 




question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute."  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843; see Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534 
(1991). 
   In the present case, it is clear that Congress has not 
"directly spoken to the precise question at issue."  Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842.  Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a), makes it an unfair labor practice for an 
"employer" to engage in certain practices, including those 
charged in this case, i.e., interfering with employees in the 
exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
157, and refusing to bargain with their employees' 
representatives.  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (5).  Section 2(2) of 
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), defines the term "employer" broadly, 
stating that it "includes any person acting as an agent of the 
employer, directly or indirectly . . . ,"  and the use of the 
term "includes" clearly indicates that this definition was not 
meant to be comprehensive.  Therefore, the language of the Act 
does not dictate the definition of an alter ego.   
 The Board, however, is charged with the responsibility of 
interpreting and enforcing the Act.  NLRB v. Curtin Matheson 
Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990); NLRB v. Erie 
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).  Thus, the Board's 
alter ego policy is properly viewed as a gap-filling measure, 
adopted through case-by-case adjudication, to flesh out the 
concept of an "employer" under the relevant provisions of the 
 
 
Act.5  See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("The power 
of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally 
created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation 
of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, 
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress") 
 Although the Act does not compel the Board's alter ego 
test, we defer to that test because it is consistent with the 
purposes and policies of the Act. See Omnitest, 937 F.2d at 118.  
We recognize the "Board's special function of applying the 
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial 
life."  Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 236; see 29 U.S.C.A. § 156.  
In the present context, determining the role of intent in alter 
ego analysis involves a policy choice requiring a balancing of, 
on the one hand, an employer's "freedom to contract . . . 
includ[ing] the right to transfer its assets, reorganize its 
business or close a portion thereof without imposing on its 
vendee the obligation to adopt its labor contract," Scott, 612 
F.2d at 789 (Sloviter, J., dissenting), and, on the other, the 
desire to protect employees from "sudden change[s] in the 
employment relationship," John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 
376 U.S. 543 (1964), and to "prevent employers from evading 
                     
5.  See In re Goodman, 873 F.2d 598, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that the question of whether an employer is an alter ego 
of a prior employer for purposes of liability under the Act is a 




obligations under the Act by merely changing or altering their 
corporate form."  Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 582.6   
 We view the Board's resolution of this conflict as 
consistent with the Act.  First, it can be argued that the 
Board's policy, which relies primarily on an examination of 
objective criteria, provides for easier and more consistent 
application of the Act than one in which intent is an essential 
element.  It may be difficult to determine intent when there are 
facially legitimate business reasons that support a change in 
corporate form.  See Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 582.  Accordingly, the 
Board's objective test arguably serves to prevent "industrial 
strife and unrest," 29 U.S.C. § 151, by restricting the ability 
of employers to use a pretext in order to avoid their labor 
obligations.  Second, the Board's policy can be defended on the 
ground that it provides a degree of protection for the legitimate 
expectations of workers who enter into a collective bargaining 
agreement with the understanding that it will continue to apply 
so long as they are working for what they regard as the "same" 
employer.  It can also be argued that the Board's policy 
furnishes this protection while at the same time generally 
                     
6.  As the Supreme Court in United States v. Shimmer, 367 U.S. 
374, 383 (1961), made clear, it is the agency's prerogative to 
choose between two competing, justifiable policy considerations: 
 
If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of 
conflicting policies that were committed to the 
agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it 
unless it appears from the statute . . . that the 




permitting changes in ownership of employers without saddling the 
successor with collective bargaining agreements to which they did 
not agree.  See Burns, 406 U.S. at 281-82.7,  In this way, the 
Board's rule can be said to promote the Act's goal of encouraging 
the use of collective bargaining arrangements as a way to balance 
economic bargaining power.8  See 29 U.S.C. § 151.  In short, 
while we are by no means sure that we would select the Board's 
test if we were choosing on our own, we find that test to be a 
permissible construction of the Act.   
 C.  Johnstown and Stardyne argue that the Board's 
interpretation of the Act is not controlling because our court 
has already held that intent is a necessary element in an alter 
ego determination.  A careful review of the law of this circuit, 
however, indicates that we have not definitively resolved this 
issue. 
 Our court first addressed the role of intent in this 
context in NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783 (3rd Cir. 
1979).  In that case, Scott Printing sold one portion of its 
business, the composing room, to two employees, id. at 785, and a 
divided panel of our court sustained the Board's conclusion that 
the new company was an alter ego of the original company and was 
                     
7.  Nor does the Act prevent an employer from going out of 
business.  See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing 
Co., 380 U.S. 263, 272 (1965). 
8.  The reasonableness of the Board's policy is further supported 
by the fact that it has been adopted by the majority of the 




therefore obligated under the Act to assume its collective 
bargaining obligations, id. at 788-89.  In support of its 
holding, the majority noted that operation of the composing room 
remained unchanged after the sale, that no rent was paid, and 
that there was substantial intermingling in the use of supplies 
and support staff.  Id. at 787-88.  As for the requirement of 
intent, the majority stated: "Assuming without deciding in this 
case the General Counsel must prove that Scott Printing intended 
to evade its duty to bargain, we find that there is substantial 
evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion."  Id. at 787 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, although Judge Sloviter argued vigorously in 
dissent that antiunion animus or an intent to evade labor 
obligations is required to support a finding that two entities 
are alter egos, id. at 790, the majority did not reach this 
question. 
 Our court again found it unnecessary to resolve this 
question in NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543 (3rd Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984).  There, we affirmed a 
Board decision holding that two construction companies were alter 
egos.  Id. at 554.  We noted the presence of objective factors 
indicative of alter ego status, such as shared space, assumption 
of debts, and the employment of the same workers.  Id.  As for 
intent, we noted:  "[I]t is significant, if not crucial, that 
[the successor company] was created after the filing of unfair 
labor practice charges against the [predecessor companies] . . . 
."  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
 
 We again discussed the alter ego question in NLRB & 
Omnitest Inspection Services, Inc., 937 F.2d 112 (3rd Cir. 1991), 
where we upheld the Board's determination of alter ego status 
based on the substantial identity of the two businesses.  On the 
question of intent, we first stated:  
 For an alter ego relationship to exist, a purpose to 
avoid the old employer's labor obligations under a 
collective bargaining agreement or under the Act must 
underlie the formation of the new employer.  Fugazy 
Continental Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. at 1302.  
 
Id. at 118.  While this statement appears to support the argument 
advanced by Johnstown and Stardyne in this case, we do not 
interpret Omnitest as having conclusively resolved the question 
at issue.  It is noteworthy that the previously quoted statement 
from the Omnitest opinion was supported solely by a citation to 
Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. at 1302.  In Fugazy 
Continental Corp., after reviewing the objective factors that 
must be considered in making an alter ego determination, the 
Board added: 
 We must also consider whether the purpose behind the 
creation of the alleged alter ego was legitimate or 
whether, instead, its purpose was to evade 
responsibilities under the Act. 
 
265 N.L.R.B. at 1302 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
Moreover, other language in the Omnitest opinion suggests that no 
single factor is essential to a determination that two entities 
are alter egos.  After listing the factors that are relevant, the 
court wrote: 
 None of these factors, however, "taken alone, is the 
sine qua non of alter ego status."  Fugazy Continental 
Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. at 1301-02; Woodline Motor 
 
 
Freight, 278 N.L.R.B. at 1231, enforced in relevant 
part, 843 F.2d at 288-89.  Instead, the sum total of 
the factors, viewed together, help determine whether 
the two employers are "`the same business in the same 
market.'"  Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. at 
1301-02 (quoting International Harvester Co. & Muller 
International Trucks, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 791, 798 
(1980)). 
 
937 F.2d at 118.  Later, the court reiterated: 
 
 As we have explained, no one factor, "taken alone, is 
the sine qua non of alter ego status."  Fugazy 
Continental Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. at 1301-02. 
 
Id. at 121.  These statements, coupled with the court's repeated 
reliance on Fugazy Continental Corp., suggest that the court did 
not intend to go beyond the proposition endorsed by the Board in 
Fugazy Continental Corp., viz., that an intent to evade 
responsibilities under the Act is a factor that must be 
considered.   
 Furthermore, we believe that the Omnitest court's holding -
- that the Board's alter ego finding was supported by substantial 
evidence -- is consistent with this interpretation.  The Board's 
finding was based on numerous factors (including an intent to 
evade obligations under the Act), and our court found that the 
Board's findings concerning these multiple factors were supported 
by substantial evidence.  Nothing in our opinion, with the 
possible exception of the first statement quoted above, suggests 
that the finding of an intent to evade responsibilities under the 
Act was critical to our holding.  For all of these reasons, we do 
not interpret Omnitest as binding circuit precedent for the 
 
 
proposition that an alter ego relationship cannot exist without 
an intent to escape obligations under the Act.   
 We most recently referred to the alter ego doctrine in 
Eichleay Corp. v. International Assoc. of Bridge, Structural and 
Ornamental Iron Workers, 944 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1285 (1992).  Eichleay Corporation, a union 
shop construction company, was a signatory to nationwide 
collective bargaining agreements known as NMAs.  After a non-
union shop subsidiary, Eichleay Constructors, Inc. ("ECI"), 
entered into a joint venture to renovate a steel mill, several 
unions filed grievances against Eichleay, claiming that it was 
performing work on the renovation project in violation of the 
NMAs.  The arbitration panel issued awards in favor of the 
unions, finding that Eichleay was "present at the project" and 
was obligated to apply the NMAs to work performed on the project.  
See 944 F.2d at 1054-55, 1058 n.11; Eichleay App. at 461-62.  The 
district court vacated the awards, but we directed that they be 
confirmed in part. 
 We interpreted part of the awards to be based on the theory 
that the NMAs impliedly required Eichleay to refrain from setting 
up another "corporation to which it transferred work to avoid the 
[NMAs]."  944 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted).  Applying the 
"extremely deferential" standard employed in reviewing 
arbitration awards, id. at 1059, we held that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the portion of the awards based on 
this theory, id. at 1059-60.  Thus, in Eichleay we sustained an 
arbitration award based on the breach of an implied contractual 
 
 
obligation.  In reviewing this award, it was not necessary to 
interpret or apply the National Labor Relations Act or the alter 
ego doctrine that the Board has developed pursuant to the Act. 
 Nevertheless, apparently because the contract question at 
issue implicated the nature of the relationship between Eichleay 
and ECI, our opinion discussed the Board's alter ego doctrine, 
and in the course of that discussion our opinion made several 
statements that appear to support the view that the Board cannot 
find an alter ego relationship unless the employer intended to 
evade its obligations under the Act.  We stated: 
 The ultimate focus of alter ego analysis, however, is 
"the existence of a disguised continuance or an 
attempt to avoid the obligations of a collective 
bargaining agreement through a sham transaction or a 
technical change in operations."  
 
944 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Al Bryant, 711 F.2d at 553) (quoting 
Carpenters Local, 690 F.2d 489 at 508).  Moreover, after noting 
that the Board, in an order not under review by our court, had 
held that Eichleay and the ECI were a single employer, we said: 
 The additional finding required for alter ego status, 
that the second company be formed to avoid the 
responsibilities of the first company's collective 
bargaining agreement, is also supported in this case. 
 
944 F.2d at 1060.  
 Although these statements seem to support the arguments 
advanced by Johnstown and Stardyne here, we do not regard them as 
controlling, since they were clearly dicta rendered in a 
substantially different context.  While it is a tradition of our 
court that one panel may not overrule a decision of a prior 
panel, that does not mean that important questions, such as the 
 
 
one before us, should be decided based on dicta such as the 
statements quoted above. 
 We therefore find that the Board's construction of the Act 
is not in conflict with any prior decision of our court, and 
since the Board's interpretation of the Act is reasonable, it 
should be accorded deference.   
 
 III. 
 We now consider whether the record supports the Board's 
application of its policy to the facts of the case.  The 
determination whether two companies are alter egos is a question 
of fact for the Board, Southport, 315 U.S. at 106, and we must, 
of course, accept the Board's factual determinations and 
reasonable inferences derived from factual determinations if they 
are supported by substantial evidence.  29 U.S.C. § 160(e); 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); Scott, 
612 F.2d at 787;  NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 
160, 164 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977).  Consequently, we are not free to 
substitute our view of the record even if we would have reached 
different conclusions on de novo review.  Universal Camera, 340 
U.S. at 488. 
 As discussed above, in order to determine whether there has 
been a true change in ownership or merely a disguised 
continuance, the Board looks to whether the new and old employers 
share "'substantially identical' management, business purpose, 
operation, equipment, customers, and supervision, as well as 
ownership."  Crawford Doors, 226 N.L.R.B. at 1144.  In addition, 
 
 
as noted, an intent to evade the Act is an important, but not an 
essential, factor.  See, e.g., Hiysota Fuel, 280 N.L.R.B. at 763 
n.2.  The main focus of the inquiry is to determine whether the 
two employers are the same business in the same market.  
International Harvester Co. & Muller Int'l Trucks, Inc., 247 
N.L.R.B. 791, 798 (1980). 
 We find that there is substantial evidence on the record to 
uphold the Board's conclusion that most of the Crawford Doors 
factors are present in this case.  Although the record does not 
indicate that Johnstown actually managed Stardyne after the spin-
off, the record does support the Board's finding of a continuity 
in the management and supervision of the laser operation.  
Several Stardyne managers, including Stardyne's president, 
managed the laser operations at Johnstown.  See Al Bryant, 711 
F.2d at 554 (alter ego finding where old managers continued to 
perform same function in new company).  
 The Board's finding of a continuity of business purpose is 
also supported in the record.  Although Stardyne argues that 
laser production took a more commercial focus under its 
leadership, the record supports the Board's view that this was a 
basic purpose of the facility under Johnstown.  Likewise, the 
Board's conclusion that a substantial identity of operation 
existed is also supported in the record.  The record clearly 
indicates that the day-to-day operation of the laser remained 
nearly unchanged after the transition.  As to identity of 
equipment, the record indicates that Stardyne used mostly the 
same equipment, except for one new laser, as was used at the 
 
 
Johnstown facility and that Stardyne's operation is located in 
the exact same place where Johnstown operated the laser 
facility.9  See Omnitest, 937 F.2d at 117 (alter ego finding when 
new business stayed in the same location).  The record also 
indicates an overlap in customer base between the two operations.  
Finally, the Board correctly concluded that Johnstown and 
Stardyne had substantially identical ownership since Johnstown 
owned 40% of Stardyne and Jack Sheehan, Johnstown's principal 
stockholder, also owned 20% of Stardyne. App. 171-72, 480-81; see 
Scott Printing, 612 F.2d at 786 (alter ego finding where previous 
owners retained substantial control after sale of business); see 
also Haley & Haley, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 649, 652 (1988), enforced 
880 F.2d 1147 (9th Cir. 1989) (substantial identity of ownership 
found in parent-subsidiary relationship).  Thus, although there 
was no finding that Johnstown exercised centralized control over 
the management of Stardyne, the remainder of the Crawford Doors 
factors are supported by the record.  The lack of an intent to 
evade obligations under the Act, weighs against a finding of 
alter ego status.  Nevertheless, the record as a whole contains 
substantial evidence supporting the Board's alter ego finding.   
                     
9.  The record also indicates that Stardyne used Johnstown's 





 The companies' final argument is that Board precedent 
prevents a finding of alter ego status because of the ALJ's 
undisturbed finding that the companies were not a single 
employer.10  In making this argument, the companies rely on the 
Board's decision in Gartner-Harf Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 531, 533 n.8 
(1992), which stated that "in Board law, alter ego is in effect a 
subset of the single employer concept . . . ."  The companies 
argue that because they do not constitute a single employer, they 
cannot be alter egos. 
 Putting aside Gartner-Harf, we see no reason why the alter 
ego doctrine must be considered a subset of the single employer 
doctrine.  Although these two doctrines are related, the Board 
has traditionally taken the position that they are distinct,  
see, e.g., Dahl Fish Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1086 (1986).  See 
also Al Bryant, 711 F.2d at 551.  See generally Iowa Express, 739 
F.2d at 1310 (explaining difference between the two doctrines).11  
The single employer doctrine generally applies to situations 
where two entities concurrently perform the same function and one 
                     
10.  The Board did not reach the ALJ's single employer 
determination because it found that the ALJ's alter ego finding 
was sufficient to support the ALJ's order.  313 N.L.R.B. at 170. 
11.  Another difference between the two doctrines is that a 
finding that two employers are a single employer does not end the 
analysis.  The two groups of employees must still be determined 
to be an appropriate single unit in order for the collective 
bargaining agreement of one to apply to the other.  See, e.g., 
South Prairie Constr., 425 U.S. at 805. 
 
 
entity recognizes the union and the other does not.  Gilroy Sheet 
Metal, 280 N.L.R.B. 1075 n.1 (1986); Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 
1310; Carpenters Local, 690 F.2d at 508.  In making a single 
employer determination, the Board uses four criteria:  
interrelation of operations, common management, centralized 
control of labor relations, and common ownership.  See Radio & 
Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of 
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam); Al Bryant, 
711 F.2d at 554; see generally McDonald, supra at 1033 n.66.  The 
alter ego doctrine, by contrast, examines seven objective 
criteria plus intent and usually comes into play when a new legal 
entity has replaced the predecessor (or at least the unionized 
portion of the predecessor).  See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 259 
n.5.  
 While we are thus unsure why the alter ego should be 
regarded as a subset of the single employer doctrine, the Board 
in Gartner-Harf appears to have so held.  Gartner-Harf involved 
the question whether a company was the alter ego of the entities 
that took over its business.  The ALJ found that the company was 
the alter ego of these entities and, although he indicated that 
the employers in question could be considered a "single 
employer," he did not expressly find that they were.  308 
N.L.R.B. at 542.  The Board reversed the ALJ, explicitly finding 
that the companies in question were not a "single employer."  Id. 
at 533.  The Board noted that the General Counsel had admitted in 
his brief that "in Board law, alter ego is in effect a subset of 
the single employer concept (i.e., not all single employers are 
 
 
alter egos, but all alter egos by definition met [sic] the 
criteria for single employer status)."  Id. at 533 n.8.  The 
Board then disposed of the General Counsel's alter ego claim by 
stating that it failed "a fortiori" since the companies did not 
constitute a single employer.  Id.  However, the Board added:  
"We also note that the record does not show that the Respondent 
is merely a disguised continuance of the old employer."  Id.    
 In this case, the Board majority attempted to distinguish 
Gartner-Harf.  Stating that it refused to "engage in extended 
dicta on theoretical differences between alter ego and single 
employer concepts,"  313 N.L.R.B. at 170 n.3, a majority of the 
Board asserted that Gartner-Harf did not apply because in 
Gartner-Harf, unlike this case, the record showed that there was 
no disguised continuance. Id.  Thus, the Board majority, without 
repudiating Gartner-Harf's teaching concerning the relationship 
between the single employer and alter ego doctrines, held that 
Johnstown and Stardyne, although apparently not a single 
employer, were nevertheless alter egos. 
 We cannot accept the Board majority's reasoning.  If it is 
true, as Gartner-Harf held, that "all alter egos by definition 
[meet] the criteria for single employer status," 308 N.L.R.B. at 
533 n.8, and if it is true, as the ALJ in this case found, that 
Johnstown and Stardyne are not a single employer, then it must 
follow that Johnstown and Stardyne are not alter egos.  On the 
other hand, if Johnstown and Stardyne are alter egos, as the 
Board held, then either Gartner-Harf's holding with respect to 
the relationship between the single employer and alter ego 
 
 
doctrines was wrong or the ALJ's finding that Johnstown and 
Stardyne are not a single employer was wrong.  For these reasons, 
the Board majority's failure to follow or repudiate Gartner-
Harf's teaching is troubling to us, as it was to the Board member 
who concurred in this case.  See 313 N.L.R.B. at 172-73 (Member 
Raudabaugh, concurring).  We are further disturbed by the Board's 
subsequent decision in Teamsters Local 776, 313 N.L.R.B. 1148 
(1994).  In that case, the Board affirmed the judgment of an ALJ 
who explicitly relied on Gartner-Harf's reasoning in deciding a 
question of alter ego status.  Teamsters Local, 313 N.L.R.B. at 
1164.   
 We hold that the Board's failure in this case to follow or 
repudiate its prior holding in Gartner-Harf was arbitrary and 
capricious and a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.  
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).12  It is well established that even when an 
agency is creating policies to fill a gap in an ambiguous 
statute, the agency has a responsibility to explain its failure 
to follow established precedent.  Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 
v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-09 (1973); King 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 860 F.2d 465, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  The 
                     
12.  Section 706 states:   
 
 The reviewing court shall . . . 
      
  (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,         
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . 
        
      (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of           




"requirement that the Board provide analysis and findings serves 
as a prophylaxis against an arbitrary exercise of the Board's 
power."  NLRB v. Armcor Industries, 535 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 
1976) (quoting Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th 
Cir. 1975)).  This not to say that the Board is forever bound by 
prior precedent, but only that when it departs from controlling 
precedent, it must present a reasoned explanation for the 
departure. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 
(1975) (Board may change policies through evolving case law).  As 
the Supreme Court has explained: 
 [An] agency may flatly repudiate those norms, 
deciding, for example that changed circumstances mean 
that they are no longer required in order to 
effectuate congressional policy.  Or it may narrow the 
zone in which the rule will be applied, because it 
appears that a more discriminating invocation of the 
rule will best serve some congressional policy.  Or it 
may find that, although the rule in general serves 
useful purposes, peculiarities of the case before it 
suggest that the rule not be applied in that case.  
Whatever the ground for the departure from prior 
norms, however, it must be clearly set forth so that 
the reviewing court may understand the basis of the 
agency's action and so may judge the consistency of 
that action with the agency's mandate. 
 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 412 U.S. at 808. 
 Here, the Board's explanation for its failure to apply 
Gartner-Harf fell short of this standard, and we therefore remand 
this case to the Board so that it can reconcile the contradictory 
case law that it has developed.  We express no view on how this 
resolution should be made, but hold only that the Board must 
provide a reasoned explanation for its refusal to apply Gartner-





 The Board's finding that Stardyne is Johnstown's successor 
is unchallenged on appeal, and therefore we grant the Board's 
application to enforce the portion of its order requiring 
Stardyne to recognize and bargain with the union that represents 
Johnstown's employees.  See page 8, footnote 3, supra.  Due to 
the need for a remand on the Gartner-Harf issue, however, we 
grant the companies' petition for review and deny the Board's 
petition for enforcement of the remainder of the order, and we 
remand this case to the Board for further proceedings. 
